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Probate Funding and the Litigation 
Funding Debate 
Jeremy Kidd, J.D., Ph.D. 
Abstract 
Third-party funding of legal claims is becoming more common, 
and increasingly more controversial. Whether in the legislative 
arena or in the courts, the fight over whether and how independent 
parties might provide funding to litigants has become heated. The 
fight now threatens to spill over into the probate realm, where 
funders have begun purchasing probate rights from putative heirs. 
These probate funding transactions share many characteristics 
with broader litigation funding but also differ in important 
respects. The meager existing literature tends to address the issue 
in a pre-biased and methodologically unsound way, making it 
impossible to properly assess the nature of probate funding. This 
Article approaches probate funding in a neutral fashion, analyzing 
the characteristics of the transaction in order to gain greater 
insights into not only probate funding but also litigation funding, 
as well as illuminating the options for lawmakers in deciding how 
the law should react to the continuing evolution of legal funding 
generally. 
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I. Introduction 
The government cares deeply about how and from whom you 
borrow money.1 Those who enact laws at the local, state, and 
federal level have imposed significant regulatory scrutiny on 
various forms of loans.2 State usury laws,3 the federal Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA),4 and a host of regulations for specialized 
loans5 are all designed to protect borrowers.6 In choosing to 
                                                                                                     
 1. See CHRISTOPHER L. ALLEN ET AL., ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, US 
REGULATION OF BANK LENDING 1 (2015), https://files.arnold 
porter.com/UsRegulationOfBankLending.pdf (describing the ways in which the 
United States controls and regulates lending). 
 2. See id. (“The lending activities of banks in the United States are 
regulated by a complex, interconnected network of federal and state laws and 
regulations.”). 
 3. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(2) (2014) (setting the maximum 
interest rate at 16% for loans where the principal is less than $3,000); N.Y. 
BANKING LAW § 14-a (2012) (setting the maximum interest rate for all loans at 
16%); CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (setting a maximum interest rate for all loans at 
10% for personal loans, and the greater of 10% or 5% plus the prevailing rate on 
the 25th of the month preceding the execution of the contract or date of the loan). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-1 (1967) (regulating the financing of 
installment purchases, particularly those made from telephone, mail order, and 
door-to-door salesmen); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1 (1987) (regulating financing 
through credit cards and bank cards); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1 (1969) (regulating 
the financing of insurance premiums); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-130 (1992) 
(regulating loans from pawnbrokers); GA. CODE ANN. §-10-1-30 (1967) (regulating 
the financing of car loans). 
 6. See supra notes 3–5 (listing various ways in which regulations seek to 
protect borrowers). It is not always clear exactly what consumers of loanable 
funds are being protected from, but for the purposes of this research, the fact of 
regulatory protections matters far more than the efficacy or necessity of those 
protections. 
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regulate loans, however, we often neglect the most important step, 
defining the subject of regulation.7 As it turns out, there is a 
surprising lack of clarity in what constitutes a “loan,” which 
creates no small amount of confusion when courts are asked to 
apply those laws and regulations to actual transactions.8 Not the 
loan you received to buy your house or a new car, and not the 
money you borrowed to finance law school or medical school, but 
less thought-of transactions like litigation funding or probate 
funding.9 This Article examines the emerging probate funding 
industry, comparing and contrasting with the better-known 
litigation funding industry, in order to understand not only the 
industries themselves but also the attributes of “loans” and why 
government regulates them heavily. 
The debate over funding of lawsuits has raged for almost a 
decade, and it has generated some peculiar coalitions—free 
marketers10 and the plaintiffs’ bar11 opposed to the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce12 and consumer advocates.13 Free marketers support 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Cherokee Funding LLC v. Ruth, 802 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2017) (noting how a regulation did “not define the term ‘loan’”). 
 8. See id. (deciding whether a certain transaction should be classified as a 
loan or an investment). 
 9. See id. at 870–71 (examining whether a form of litigation funding could 
be considered a “loan”); In re Birnbaum, 118 Misc. 2d 267, 270 (N.Y. Sur. 1983) 
(evaluating a dispute over funding following probate). 
 10. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
367, 367–68 (2009) (advocating for the creation of a market to spread legal risks); 
Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
329, 329–30 (1987) (advocating for markets in personal injury claims); Jeremy 
Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the 
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 613–14 (2012) 
[hereinafter To Fund or Not To Fund] (arguing that litigation funding improves 
efficiency in the legal system). 
 11. At least in the consumer legal funding context, it is the clients of the 
plaintiffs’ bar that are more often in need of legal funding options. See Kidd, supra 
note 10, at 628 (“Plaintiffs bear the costs associated with time delays in obtaining 
their day in court, including depletion of defendants’ assets, which may not be 
available to satisfy any damages award.”). 
 12.  See JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD PARTY 
INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 4–6 (2012), https://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf (presenting several arguments as to why 
a litigation market is undesirable). 
 13.  See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of National Association of Consumer 
Advocates et al. in Support of Respondents at 12, Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. 
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the ability of litigation funders to offer their services without 
government regulation, aligning with the plaintiffs’ bar that sees 
litigation funding as an opportunity for lower- or middle-class 
plaintiffs to afford their day in court.14 Consumer advocates worry 
that litigation funding is exploitative, similar to payday lenders, 
aligning them with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which believes 
that litigation financing exploits plaintiffs—reducing beneficial 
settlements, distorting the attorney-client relationship, increasing 
frivolous claims—for profits.15 
As a relatively new phenomenon, probate funding has been 
covered minimally in the literature.16 In order to place probate 
funding in the context of the larger debate over the funding of legal 
claims, Part II will provide a basic primer on probate funding and 
place probate funding in the context of a larger market for financial 
capital.17 
Within the larger legal funding debate, and the legislative and 
judicial battles that serve as the battleground for the future of legal 
funding, the definition of “loan” takes on extra importance, as 
existing regulations often encompass only those situations with a 
borrower and a lender.18 Given this importance, it is unfortunate 
                                                                                                     
Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015) (No. 13SC497) (stating that litigation 
financing should be prevented in order “to protect vulnerable borrowers seeking 
to prosecute their personal injury claims”). 
 14. See Molot, supra note 10, at 411 (arguing for “litigation risk markets” as 
a private sector solution to the barriers posed by high litigation costs). 
 15. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 4–6 (stating that litigation 
funding has “at least four negative consequences for the sound administration of 
civil justice”). 
 16. Professors Horton and Chandrasekher have begun the conversation 
about probate funding, albeit with sloppy empirics that obscure more than they 
reveal. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 
YALE L.J. 102, 107 (2016) (“Yet despite the attention lavished on the 
litigation-finance industry, inheritance-purchasing companies have flown 
beneath the radar. No law review article has even mentioned the issue . . . .”); see 
also Jeremy Kidd, Clarifying the “Probate Lending” Debate: A Response to 
Professors Horton and Chandrasekher, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 149, 150 
(2018) (stating that the Horton and Chandrasekher article “does not make the 
impact that it should have made, due to some unfortunate and avoidable 
missteps”). 
 17. Infra Part II. 
 18. See, e.g., Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 409 (Colo. 
2015) (holding that litigation funding was a loan under the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code); Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 96–97 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding that litigation funding was not a loan subject to 
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that some commentators have given short shrift to the question.19 
This Article will not make the same mistake, beginning with a 
discussion of loans in Part III, applying legal and economic 
principles to identify the proper categorization of probate funding 
and litigation funding. Because neither fits a reasonable definition 
of “loan,” the Part concludes that neither state usury laws nor 
federal regulations, such as TILA, are applicable.20 
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance are also 
regularly invoked in the debate over litigation funding.21 As 
probate funding becomes better understood, it is natural that the 
subject will arise in that context, as well.22 Any discussion of 
champerty and maintenance rules should also address the related 
argument that laws and regulations governing loans and 
investments are necessary to protect consumers from fraudulent, 
manipulative, or coercive behavior, or that funders’ presence will 
change the very nature of the dispute.23 Part IV will examine these 
concerns as they pertain to probate and litigation funding, to 
determine if the doctrines are appropriate in either context. Part  V 
will then offer some conclusory remarks. 
                                                                                                     
state usury laws). 
 19.  Much of the bias is subtle, and may even be unconscious, as in choosing 
a title like Probate Lending, which implies to the reader that he or she is about to 
read an article about a type of loan. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16 
(discussing probate funding). 
 20. Infra Part III. 
 21. See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party 
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286–1291 (2011) (“The primary 
barrier [to third-party funding of litigation] is the doctrine of maintenance and 
champerty.”); Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in 
Search of a Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 919, 921 (2015) (describing champerty’s impact on third-party litigation 
funding); Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About 
Control?, 82 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2939 (2014) (discussing the intersection of 
litigation financing and champerty); Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After 
the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2011) 
(describing the history of champerty). 
 22. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 155–59 (analyzing 
champerty’s potential effect on probate lending). 
 23. See Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1274–75 (describing multiple avenues of 
protection available for client protection in a client-litigation funder relationship). 
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II. Probate Funding vs. Litigation Funding 
The general form of the transaction used in probate funding is 
essentially the same as that used in litigation funding.24 A party to 
a legal dispute receives money from the funder in return for an 
anticipated payment upon successful resolution of the dispute. In 
both cases, the funding is nonrecourse,25 so the funder only 
receives a subsequent payment if there is a positive monetary 
outcome for the owner of the dispute.26 The inherent uncertainties 
of our legal system create the possibility that a funder may receive 
nothing or, possibly, that any final award will be less than the 
original payment, resulting in a loss to the funder.27 
Although the general form may be similar, the precise forms 
differ in an important way. In probate funding, a potential heir 
may alienate not only her right to the proceeds of the dispute, but 
also the right to participate in the dispute.28 In other words, the 
funder provides a payment and receives, as compensation, the 
right to step into the probate dispute and participate directly and 
for its own benefit.29 This differs significantly from litigation 
funding, where the plaintiff receives a payment from the funder 
but retains full ownership of—and control over—the claim.30 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 103 (referring to 
litigation funding and probate funding as “similar phenomenon[a],” while also 
describing the transactional nature of both actions). 
 25. See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 455, 459 (2012) (stating that litigation funding is typically non-recourse); 
Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 115 (referring to the potentially 
non-recourse nature of probate funding). 
 26. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 459 (“Litigation finance-for-profit, 
nonrecourse funding of a litigation by a nonparty-is a new and rapidly developing 
industry globally, and in the United States in particular.”). 
 27. The loss arises because the transaction is nonrecourse, leaving the 
recipient without any personal liability for any shortfall. In the case of probate 
funding, Professors Horton and Chandrasekher have documented a handful of 
cases where the heir’s claims were lower than the amount received, and, in one 
case, where there was no recovery. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, 
at 143 (“[T]hree loans resulted in lender losses . . . .”). 
 28. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 121 (“[W]hen an outside 
party purchases a portion of the decedent’s assets, she also obtains the power to 
file petitions and objections, to seek to remove the personal representative, and 
to sue for breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
 29. See id. at 121 (explaining the alienation ability of probate funding). 
 30. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 487 (“Particularly in the United States, 
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Similar to litigation funding, the rights obtained by the probate 
funder are constrained by the legal rights possessed by the 
potential heir, so any recovery cannot be greater than the heir’s 
legal inheritance, as determined by the probate process.31  
Probate funding also looks like litigation funding in its basic 
purpose—providing funds that the legal claimant wants now, 
instead of at the conclusion of the dispute.32 A potential heir may 
receive notice that she has a potential inheritance coming her way 
but be unable or unwilling to wait for probate to conclude.33 
Perhaps there are pressing financial obligations that can be 
satisfied only from the inheritance and that cannot be put off for 
the duration of probate.34 Perhaps the heir does not wish to spend 
the duration of probate being forced to remember the individual 
who has passed,35 or to interact with other heirs.36 Perhaps the heir 
                                                                                                     
ethical rules rooted in the desire to allow plaintiffs to retain maximum control 
over their claims have naturally led to discussions of the industry in ethical terms, 
creating a clear obstacle to litigation funding.”). 
 31. The funding transaction could, therefore, result in the heir being entirely 
removed from the dispute, with the funder having sole rights to pursue the heir’s 
interest. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 115–16 (“Today, many 
funders not only buy a stake in a pending case but try to maximize the value of 
their investment by acquiring the power to select counsel and make strategic 
decisions.”). Alternatively, the heir could transfer only a part of her interest and 
remain active in the probate process. Id. This raises the possibility that the heir 
could take the money and then oppose the funder’s legal moves, so a funder’s ideal 
situation would likely involve either a full transfer of rights or else a contractual 
obligation by the heir to not obstruct the funder’s efforts. See id. at 118–24 
(explaining the process of probate funding). 
 32. See id. at 118 (“Like civil plaintiffs with potential judgments, heirs and 
beneficiaries have also tried to trade their future inheritance rights for cash.”). 
 33. See id. at 125 (“Representatives of [probate lending firms] defended their 
methods, noting that probate can be agonizingly slow and that a decedent’s 
relatives often cannot wait for bequests or legacies to trickle through the court 
system.”). 
 34. See id. (discussing reasons for probate lending). 
 35. Whether the heir had a wonderful relationship with the deceased or a 
horrible one—as would be the case if there were a history of abuse, for 
example— it would not be irrational to wish to avoid the constant reminders that 
would come during probate. 
 36. When Death Brings Out the Worst: Family Fighting After a Death, WYG 
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://whatsyourgrief.com/family-fighting-after-a-death/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the familial problems which can follow the death 
of a family member) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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has a high time preference37 and is concerned about the potentially 
lengthy duration of the probate process.38 
The first of these explanations is plausible in both litigation 
and probate funding; it also often gives rise to a claim of 
exploitation.39 The argument is that the funder acts like a payday 
lender, obtaining consent under financial duress—or by fraudulent 
means—and causing harm to the recipient of funds.40 Even if true, 
that argument glosses over the facts that the duress is not 
derivative of any action by the funder and that the funder is 
providing at least a partial solution to the duress.41 That solution 
may not be ideal, but it certainly appears preferable to the 
alternative, which is that the recipient receives nothing and 
continues in the high-stress state.42 
The second is realistic only in the context of probate funding 
because a recipient of litigation funding must remain an active 
part of the case.43 Given the cause of a probate dispute—death of 
                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Lyon, Why Economists Discount Future Benefits, 92 
ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 253, 254–55 (1996) (explaining that individuals’ 
preference for immediate benefits leads them to place a lower value on future 
benefits). 
 38. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 125 (relating the 
justifications offered by probate funding executives). 
 39. See Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation 
Funding at the Bargaining Table, 68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 268 (2015) (noting 
concern amongst commentators “that financiers exploit consumers by charging 
exorbitant fees”). 
 40. But see Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 
15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 64–68 (2011) (disputing that payday lenders use misleading 
contracts and questioning the conclusion that they trick consumers into rolling 
over their loans); Todd J. Zywicki, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday 
Lending 23–24 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 09–28, 2009), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/WP0928_Payday-Lending.pdf (concluding 
that consumers of payday lending services know what they are getting, are 
satisfied with what they receive, and have limited options in modern financial 
markets). 
 41. See Zywicki, supra note 40, at 23 (arguing payday lenders provide a 
valuable service by enabling borrowers to cope with unexpected financial 
disruption).  
 42. See, e.g., id. at 23–24 (“Banning payday lending in these uncertain times 
would whipsaw these middle-class consumers, driving them still further down the 
‘lending ladder’ to pawnshops or other products.”). 
 43. Cf. Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 
1540 (1996) (describing the reasons companies assigned claims would desire a 
plaintiff to stay involved). 
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someone who was an important person in the heir’s life—a 
reasonable heir could legitimately want some distance from 
probate.44 Many traditional plaintiffs might choose to sell their 
claims and leave behind the traumatic event that gave rise to their 
legal claims. Unfortunately, they are prohibited from doing so,45 
but an heir is not and can take her payment and never think about 
the probate dispute again. 
The third possibility is almost never discussed in the context 
of either probate or litigation funding, but it is a simple economic 
reality that individuals choose to mitigate their risks and satisfy 
their time preference.46 It should be obvious that most people have 
some preference for security47 but, if not, flourishing insurance 
markets provide hard evidence.48 Likewise, it is common sense 
that, if presented with a choice of a sum of money now or the same 
amount of money in a year, the vast majority of people will choose 
the money now.49 Either a traditional plaintiff or a potential heir 
could therefore be excused for making a reasoned tradeoff between 
                                                                                                     
 44. Cf. Constance D. Smith, New and Improved Testaments for Estate 
Planning Documents, 32 COLO. LAW. 73, 73 (2003) (discussing the potential for 
legal documents to “soothe or aggravate the survivors’ pain” in the probate 
process).  
 45. See Geoffrey P. Miller, On the Costs of Civil Justice, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 
2115 (2002) (“In most cases, the plaintiff can sell res judicata only to the 
defendant, and the defendant can buy it only from the plaintiff.”). 
 46. See Lyon, supra note 37, at 254–55; see also HENRY N. BUTLER, 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR 
LAWYERS 292–93 (3d ed. 2014) (explaining how individuals estimate the expected 
value of various situations). 
 47. Even many who engage in risky behavior, like skydiving, for example, 
likely purchase auto, home, and health insurance. They insure against some 
risks, even if they seek out a specific type of risks. 
 48. Cf. David M. Cutler, Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, Preference 
Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 157, 161 (2008) (finding that while individuals who take more risk 
still purchase insurance, they purchase lower coverage of insurance than their 
risk-adverse counterparts).  
 49. Of course, the level of time preference can vary significantly between 
individuals, as has been known for many years. See, e.g., Walter Mischel et al., 
Cognitive and Attentional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification, 21 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 204, 215 (1972) (finding children had innately 
different strategies and preferences that led to their ability to defer receiving a 
reward for a more preferable reward or preferring a quicker but less preferable 
reward). 
270 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 261 (2019) 
a future sum—adjusted for the uncertainty of victory, deductions 
for legal costs, etc.—and a certain sum today.50 
There are likely many more potential reasons why a plaintiff 
or heir would choose to receive an up-front payment that will likely 
be less than the amount later received by the funder.51 These three, 
however, particularly when combined, provide ample justification 
for accepting as rational the choice to enter into a funding 
transaction. Expanding the discussion to include all forms of 
legitimate funding,52 it is clear that individuals regularly agree to 
make a larger payment in the future in exchange for receipt of 
funds today. Whether the purpose of the initial funds is to start a 
business; to purchase a home, car, education, etc.; to pay living 
expenses during trial; or to avoid the hassle of participating in 
probate, people of every socioeconomic class voluntarily agree to 
the tradeoff. Any discussion of funding, therefore, should dispense 
with assumptions about the irrationality of recipients unless there 
is specific evidence of that irrationality.  
Returning to the structure of probate funding, it may be 
helpful to imagine it situated on a field defined by two axes. The 
first is the contingent nature of the obligation to make the future 
payment.53 The second is who maintains control over the thing of 
value.54 Probate funding is at least partially contingent, and the 
funder controls the claim.55 Litigation, on the other hand, is 
                                                                                                     
 50. Indeed, an entire sub-industry has arisen within the legal community, in 
which companies provide a single lump-sum amount to individuals who have 
received a structured settlement. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing 
Structured Settlements, 51 B.C. L. REV. 39, 57 n.97 (2010) (citing that settlements 
may be liquidated for less than the premium set forth for them). These 
transactions are motivated by a combination of both risk-aversion and 
time-preference factors. 
 51. Cf. Steven D. Schroeder, Probate Funding: A Useful Option for So Many, 
LITIG. FIN. J. (June 26, 2018), https://litigationfinancejournal.com/probate-
funding-useful-option-many/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing potential 
reasons for wanting to pursue probate funding) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 52. Excluding loan sharks and illegal gambling advances in order to avoid a 
discussion of black-market incentives. 
 53. See Kidd, supra note 16, at 151 (discussing contingent nature of probate 
funding as the obligation to repay a debt).  
 54. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 110–30 (contrasting the 
control permitted over the claim between litigation funding and probate funding 
situations).  
 55. See Kidd, supra note 16, at 151 (describing the nature of probate funding 
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partially contingent but the recipient controls the claim.56 Other 
financial transactions can also be identified by their location on 
these axes. A nonrecourse home loan is less contingent than a 
recourse loan,57 and a home loan in a mortgage state is more at the 
control of the recipient than a home loan in a deed-of-trust state.58 
A payday loan is more contingent because of the increased risk of 
default, and a payday lender often has the right to access the 
recipient’s bank account, something unavailable to the holder of a 
home mortgage.59 
Even business investments can be categorized in a similar 
fashion, with bondholders’ right to be paid being far less contingent 
than a venture capitalist or similar investors.60 Bondholders also 
have far less control over the thing of value—the assets upon which 
the bonds are predicated—than a direct investor, though the latter 
will differ based on the type of investor and the terms of the 
                                                                                                     
as contingent where the probate funder has the right to pursue some portion of 
the heir’s claim). 
 56. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 487 (describing the desire articulated in 
the ethical rules to allow plaintiffs to maintain maximum control over their 
litigation claims related to litigation funding).  
 57. The difference being, of course, that the recipient of a nonrecourse home 
loan risks only ownership of the home, where the recipient of a recourse loan is 
on the hook for the full unpaid balance, so additional assets might be lost. 
 58. In a deed of trust state, legal title to the property passes to a trustee, who 
holds the property in trust until the loan is repaid. See Joshua Norton, Comment, 
Left to Their Own (Security) Devices: The Need for the California Legislature to 
Define Deeds of Trust and Update California Civil Code Section 2932.5 in 
Accordance with the Modern Lien Theory, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 197, 206 (2013) 
(“With a deed of trust, the borrower would convey actual title and the right to sell 
the property to the trustee for the benefit of a lender and beneficiary in the case 
of default.”). In a mortgage state, legal title to the property passes to the recipient 
of funds, subject to forfeiture in the event the recipient defaults on his/her 
payments. See id. at 205–06 (“[T]he mortgage is a security device that empowers 
the mortgagee to initiate a judicial foreclosure on the property upon breach of the 
contract to pay the debt.”). 
 59. See Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog Is on 
a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its Authority to Declare Payday-Loan Practices 
Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 388 (2012) (describing 
the payday loan business model and access to borrowers’ bank accounts as a 
necessity of carrying out that model). 
 60. But see Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 730 (2010) (describing how the Chrysler bankruptcy 
proceeding violated basic principles of bankruptcy law and introduced significant 
uncertainty into the process). 
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contract.61 A visual representation of these relationships is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
Obviously, this is a visual representation of relative positions 
of various financial transactions, not an empirical assertion 
                                                                                                     
 61. For example, Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign saw private 
equity firm Bain Capital criticized as immoral, at best, for its method of 
restructuring, which often included laying off significant numbers of workers. See 
Matt Taibbi, Greed and Debt: The True Story of Mitt Romney and Bain Capital, 
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 29, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ 
news/greed-and-debt-the-true-story-of-mitt-romney-and-bain-capital-20120829 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the business relationship between Mitt 
Romney and Bain Capital including the methods for restructuring businesses 
through investments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). To the 
extent this was done through investment, rather than outright purchase of the 
company, it would fall on the funder-control end of the spectrum, whereas a family 
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regarding their precise characteristics. Many categories of 
financial transaction will have some variance in their position on 
one or both axes.62 For example, a deed-of-trust or mortgage loan 
will vary in its contingent nature depending on whether it is 
contingent or not, and private equity investors will choose how 
much control they insist upon having.63 The contingent nature of a 
bond purchase depends on a number of factors, not least of which 
is how strictly the federal courts apply priority rules.64 Litigation 
funding transactions must always remain in the control of the 
plaintiff, as per legal ethics rules, but a funder might, theoretically, 
be granted greater or lesser influence on various decisions.65 
Figure 1 serves two important purposes. First, within the 
context of this Part, it presents the important differences between 
litigation funding and probate funding, helping to define where 
probate funding falls within the realm of financial transactions. 
Second, as we proceed to the following discussion of loans and how 
they are identified, it is helpful to understand probate funding’s 
relation to traditional loan transactions. Specifically, that it is 
difficult to place them in the same quadrant. 
III. What’s a Loan? 
You receive a sum of money today and you promise to pay the 
source a greater sum in the future—are you the recipient of a loan? 
Perhaps, but the obvious choice might be wrong, given some 
additional context. As previously discussed, there are fundamental 
differences between investments—and even between different 
types of investments—and traditional loans, to say nothing of the 
                                                                                                     
 62. Cf. infra notes 55–61 (providing examples of different financial 
transactions and their variance across the contingent and control axes).  
 63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of a 
deed-of-trust and mortgage loan in regard to its contingent nature).  
 64. See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 60, at 741–51 (2010) (describing the 
ways in which the Chrysler bankruptcy violated statutory provisions and 
established norms, to the detriment of certain debtholders).  
 65. Cf. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 115–16 (“Today, many 
funders not only buy a stake in the pending case, but try to maximize the value 
of their investment by acquiring the power to select counsel and make strategic 
decisions.”).  
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transactions that fall somewhere in between.66 Is the repayment a 
binding contractual obligation or is it merely aspirational? Is 
repayment contingent upon some future event, such as a profitable 
quarter, or is it absolute, with the defaulting recipient’s being 
subject to legal sanctions? Does the funder have any control over 
the recipient’s valuable assets? 
The law treats loans and investments differently at both the 
state and federal level.67 There may be very good reasons to make 
the distinction, but, as a preliminary matter, it is important to 
recognize the legal difficulty this presents. When a transaction is 
not clearly in one category or the other, the provider of funds will 
find itself in a quandary.68 It can proceed under the assumption 
that the more lenient regulatory regime governing investments 
applies, but it then runs the risk of lawsuits or even criminal 
prosecution if it is later determined that it is offering loans and its 
rate of return is too high.69 This quandary has important 
implications for innovation in the finance industry.  
Some innovation will occur at the easily-categorized extremes 
of the spectrum, as either clearly an investment or clearly a loan. 
It is far more likely, however, that innovations will occur outside 
of the traditional boundaries of an industry, as entrepreneurs seek 
to occupy an unfilled niche.70 The lack of a clear line of demarcation 
between loan and investment increases the uncertainty costs 
associated with innovation, and some innovation will be stymied 
as a result.71 Similarly, when a dispute arises, courts must attempt 
                                                                                                     
 66. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (offering examples); infra 
notes 69–71 and accompanying text (offering examples). 
 67. For example, neither state usury laws nor TILA apply to investments. 
Infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text; infra note 115. 
 68. See Tow v. Pajooh, (In re CRCGP LLC), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 370, at *4–6 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (discussing the importance of differentiation between 
loans and investments related to determining appropriate interest rates).  
 69. See id. (discussing the ramifications for an improper classification as an 
investment when in fact the transaction was a loan). 
 70. Cf. Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Surplus, Agency Theory, and 
the Hobbesian Corporation, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 721, 727 (2016) (“The 
entrepreneur must first identify this [fresh and unexploited] market niche.”). 
 71. Frank Knight made the distinction between risk and uncertainty, 
arguing that risk was associated with outcomes that had occurred before but 
whose future occurrences were reducible only to probabilities and uncertainty 
was associated with outcomes for which no probabilities were calculable because 
the outcome had never been realized in the past. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 
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to discern which regulatory rules to apply to those involved.72 
Given the potential consequences for those involved, a clearer line 
should be established. 
Applying that line to probate and litigation funding will 
require consideration of the contingencies inherent in both 
circumstances. Because probate only commences when there is an 
actual estate to divide, frivolous claims will be limited to individual 
claims of being an heir rather than the lawsuit in its entirety.73 
That, and other contrasts between litigation and probate funding, 
might make one or both less likely to be a loan.74 Importantly, 
however, the dividing line need not fall between the two, as it is 
possible that either both or neither are loans.75 Furthermore, while 
                                                                                                     
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233 (photo. reprint 2014) (1921). In the funding context, 
whether a court will apply loan regulations to existing services is more a question 
of risk, but whether a court will apply those restrictions to as-yet unknown 
funding services is a question of uncertainty. The speed of innovation in the 
financial sector has resulted in the process receiving its own nickname, “Fintech.” 
It is clear that innovation is not completely stymied in the industry, but, at the 
margin, increased costs must have a negative impact. See BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & 
SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 5 (“[M]argin refers to the impact of a small change 
in one variable on another variable. For example, if the price (cost) of a product 
increases relative to the prices of other products, the people ‘at the margin’ will 
substitute the now lower cost product for the higher cost product.”). 
 72. See Pajooh, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 370, at *4–6 (assessing whether the 
transaction constituted a loan or an investment and what regulatory regime to 
apply).  
 73. Someone might make a baseless claim to being an heir, but the probate 
process itself is still a valid attempt to properly divide the estate among all 
legitimate claimants. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 25–26 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2000) (describing the probate process and goals of dividing property). By contrast, 
a lawsuit may have no basis in fact or law. Compare id. at 798 (discussing the 
requirements of probate, including an underlying decedent, before addressing the 
division of property and any disputes among potential heirs), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a) (stating the person stating a claim for relief must simply make a short plain 
statement for the grounds of jurisdiction, entitlement to relief, and alternate 
reliefs sought without necessarily requiring an underlying situation the court 
would be required to solve).  
 74. Cf. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 110–29 (discussing the 
differences between probate funding and litigation funding). 
 75. Compare id. (classifying probate funding and litigation funding as loans), 
with Kidd, supra note 16, at 151 (concluding while it is possible for probate 
funding to be a loan, it could potentially be an investment as well). 
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the contingent nature of the obligation to pay the funder is an 
important consideration,76 it should not be the only one. 
A. What Does the Law Have to Say? 
The Restatement (First) of Contracts makes it illegal “to pay 
excessive interest for a loan or to promise to do so,”77 with 
“excessive” defined by separate state law.78 It also states that 
usury requires that “the debt must be unconditionally 
repayable.”79 The Restatement next creates an express exception 
to usury rules for those contracts in which “repayment” was 
contingent on “the occurrence of a condition,”80 but warns that 
usury rules would still apply if the diminution in repayment upon 
failure of the condition were “slight” or if “the probability of the 
occurrence of the contingency on which diminished payment is 
promised is remote.”81 If so, the courts would presume that the 
                                                                                                     
 76. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 
96–97 (Tex. App. 2006) (refusing to apply usury laws to a litigation funding 
agreement because the funder’s ability to recover was contingent on the outcome 
of the lawsuit); Capela v. J.G. Wentworth, LLC, No. CV09-882(SJF)(WDW), 2009 
WL 3128003, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (reasoning that a structured 
settlement was not a loan because there was no absolute obligation to pay the 
settlement installments); Sheri P. Adler, Note, Alternative Litigation Finance and 
the Usury Challenge: A Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329, 334–35 
(2012) (stating the majority rule that litigation funding is not subject to usury 
laws because they are only contingently repayable). But see Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., 
LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 409 (Colo. 2015) (determining that an absolute 
repayment obligation was not necessary for the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
definition of loan to apply). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 78. See id., Special Note (“The rate permitted by law varies in different 
States, and often in the same State in regard to different kinds of loans.”). The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains no mention of usury restrictions so, 
to the extent courts prefer to refer to the Restatement—as opposed to the state 
laws making usury illegal—they must cite the First Restatement. See, e.g., WRI 
Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 212 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(applying the Restatement (First) of Contracts for a usury issue). For an example 
of such a state law, see GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(1)(C)(2) (2018) (establishing a 
maximum rate of 16% interest for loans under $3,000); id. § 7-4-10(a) (requiring 
the forfeiture of any interest should the creditor attempt to collect greater than 
the maximum rate of interest). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 80. Id. § 527. 
 81. Id. cmt. a. 
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contract, though meeting the formal requirements for the 
exception, is merely a “device for obtaining usurious profit.”82 
These two sections give rise to the current standard for what 
constitutes a “loan”—the obligation to repay may not be 
contingent.83 Precisely what counts as “contingent,” however, 
remains a subject of dispute among the academic literature and in 
the courts.84 Some argue, in effect, that statistically small 
contingencies should be disregarded as merely “colorable,”85 an 
appeal to the early Restatement, which contained warnings for the 
courts to be on the lookout for usurious loans concealed in 
camouflaging language.86  
The authors of the Restatement were wisely anticipating 
human nature, which is that individuals will look for some way to 
circumvent restrictions on their self-interest.87 If nothing else, 
caution regarding the rule of law would raise concerns about 
individuals’ ability to bypass legitimate laws and regulations 
merely by being cleverer in packaging the transaction than the 
drafters of those laws and regulations.88  
                                                                                                     
 82. Id.; see also Vee Bee Serv. Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590, 
600 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (ignoring “pretended” contingencies when determining 
whether usury laws apply). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 526–527 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).  
 84. See Justin T. Toth, Texas Usury Law: When Is a Borrower’s Promise to 
Repay Absolute?, 32-OCT HOUS. LAW. 42, 43–45 (1994) (discussing the difficulties 
courts have had in applying the contingent rule for usury). 
 85. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 141–42 (“The odds that 
the lender will get burned ‘must be substantial . . . for a mere colorable hazard 
will not prevent the charge from being usurious.’”). Professors Horton and 
Chandrasekher conclude that probate funding transactions are “absolutely 
repayable.” See id. at 143 (“Like the litigation loans in these cases, probate loans 
are ‘absolutely repayable.’”); see also Walton Guano Co. v. Copelan, 37 S.E. 411, 
413–14 (Ga. 1900) (“To carry the case beyond the usury statute, however, the 
hazard or contingency must be bona fide, and not a mere color of a risk, or such 
possibilities of unexpected loss as might occur in the ordinary course of the 
borrowing and lending of money.”). 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1932) (“[T]he transaction, though intended as a loan with interest, is sometimes 
disguised as a sale, or all or part of the promised payments by the borrower, aside 
from the principal, are stated as commissions or expenses.”). 
 87. See BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 384–85 (describing 
human behavior to want to minimize costs and maximize benefits and how 
individuals have a tendency to commit crimes when the cost of punishment is less 
than the benefit they obtain for committing the crime). 
 88. Cf. Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other 
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An absolute rule requiring courts to disregard small 
contingencies, however, faces two important obstacles. First, the 
Restatement does not provide a clear definition for what 
constitutes a “remote” contingency.89 Given the nature of 
statistical measures—that a small probability can still be a 
statistically significant one90—it is impossible to define a valid 
threshold for what contingencies can be summarily dismissed. 
Second, the Restatement itself rejects a blanket approach, focusing 
instead on the intent of the parties to the transaction.91 It is 
legitimate to question a transaction that appears to have no real 
risk, but the purpose of doing so is to determine whether the funder 
intended to make a loan—intended to have an absolute right of 
repayment—and is hiding that intent behind creative terms and 
clever structure.92 
Another way in which the risk debate gets sidetracked is a 
focus on ex-post success rates, rather than ex ante probabilities. It 
is not uncommon to hear opponents of litigation funding argue 
that, because funders receive over 90% of the funds they were 
promised from the recipients, that there is no real risk.93 An early 
                                                                                                     
Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 85 (2002) (describing instances where 
parties structured transactions to create contingency and avoid usury laws). 
Whether or not the laws and regulations are good policy choices are an equally 
important but separate matter. 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 527 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932) 
(“If the probability of the occurrence of the contingency on which diminished 
payment is promised is remote, or if the diminution should the contingency occur 
is slight as compared with the possible profit to be obtained if the contingency 
does not occur, the transaction is presumably usurious.”). 
 90. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xxii, xxiv (2d ed. 2010) (describing situations that are 
outliers—or carry small probabilities of occurrence—as “Black Swans” but stating 
they carry an extreme impact as well and describing the events of September 11, 
2001 as a “Black Swan” where it was extremely unlikely to occur, but carried an 
extreme impact). 
 91. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1932) (“[T]he usurious nature of the transaction frequently depends upon the 
intention with which it is entered into.”). 
 92. Cf. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(explaining the necessity of intentional charging; creating a transaction that 
charges usurious rates separate from the necessity that the party be malicious in 
that intention).  
 93. Although even the U.S. Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform concedes 
that there is risk, it argues that the risk can be mitigated by spreading it across 
a portfolio of cases. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 4 (“[Third-party 
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entrant into the probate funding debate has made the same 
argument,94 but its premise is so fundamentally flawed that it is 
difficult to take the argument seriously.95 Stating the flaw 
succinctly, ex ante probabilities and ex post results are separate 
and independent questions, and the former is not always 
represented in the latter.  
Consider a simple probability example. You bet $50 on the flip 
of a coin. You bet on heads and the flip comes up tails. You lose, 
and your ex-post success rate is zero, even though your ex ante 
probability of winning was 50%. Extending the example, if you bet 
on heads fifty times in a row and the flip comes up tails fifty times 
in a row, your ex-post success rate is still zero and the ex-ante 
probability of each flip was still 50%.96 In similar fashion, an angel 
investor or venture capitalist—or even day trader97— might have 
tremendous success for a long time but that high ex-post success 
rate is irrelevant to the nature of the transactions, which have an 
ex-ante probability of success of less than 100%. 
Returning to the test proposed by the Restatement, what do 
the parties to a probate or litigation funding transactions intend? 
The recipient intends to receive funds right now, rather than at the 
end of an uncertain legal process.98 The funder provides funding 
                                                                                                     
litigation financing] providers can mitigate their downside risk by spreading the 
risk of any particular case over their entire portfolio of cases and by spreading the 
risk among their investors.”). 
 94. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 109 (“[T]he probate 
lenders in our dataset recouped the principal ninety-six percent of the time. Even 
more remarkably, all the probate loans in our dataset that were repaid surpass 
California’s usury limit.”). 
 95. For a description of this and other foundational flaws in Horton and 
Chandrasekher, see Kidd, supra note 16. In a subsequent piece, Horton doubles 
down on the methodological and logical flaws, rather than fixing them. See David 
Horton, Borrowing in the Shadow of Death: Another Look at Probate Lending, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2447, 2476–94 (2018) (presenting empirical results without 
addressing methodological flaws). 
 96. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE 
OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS 155 (2005) (“If a series is long enough you 
may get eight heads or eight tails in a row, perhaps even ten of each. Yet you 
know that in spite of these wins the conditional odds of getting a head or a tail is 
still 50%.”). 
 97. See id. (discussing the application of the concept of “regression to the 
mean” to stock brokers). 
 98. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 125 (describing the 
benefit of cash immediately in exchange for assignment of proceeds from eventual 
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now in exchange for the right to recover some portion of a potential 
future award or settlement.99 An experienced funder will, of 
course, develop methods of choosing where to allocate funding so 
as to maximize the likelihood of success,100 so the funder will 
anticipate that a strong majority of the funding transactions will 
end up being profitable. In the case of litigation funders, that 
anticipation is all that the funder has, as there are very few—if 
any—ways in which a litigation funder can impact the result.101 
Given the fact that a probate funder takes control of at least a part 
of the heir’s claim, the funder’s anticipation of profit will be coupled 
with an understanding of the work that will need to be done in 
order to achieve it.102 
The relative success of funders notwithstanding, funding of 
legal claims is an industry filled with uncertainties that arise from 
the very nature of the judicial process.103 The fact that a fallible 
human being—the judge—holds the power to make vital legal 
determinations would be sufficient to create risk of an adverse 
outcome,104 but each other party to the dispute will also engage in 
                                                                                                     
inheritances). 
 99. See id. (describing the process whereby an heir will assign a future 
interest in an estate for current payoff).  
 100. A funder who cannot do so will soon be either bankrupt or looking for 
new ways to invest her money. Professors Horton and Chandrasekher express 
incredulity that probate funders could achieve their high success rates unless 
success were a foregone conclusion. Cf. id. at 109 (“We prove that probate loans 
involve no such contingency. Indeed, the probate lenders in our dataset recouped 
the principal ninety-six percent of the time. Even more remarkably, all probate 
loans in our dataset that were repaid surpass California’s usury limit.”). In 
essence, they have identified nothing more than the fact that there is a very small 
variance in the outcomes for the probate claims that the funder has chosen to 
become involved in. Given the need for any business to have a business model 
that avoids as many industry-specific risks as possible, it is unclear what other 
outcome they anticipate would exist in a market with free entry and exit. 
 101. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 487 (describing the desire articulated in 
the ethical rules to allow plaintiffs to maintain maximum control over their 
litigation claims related to litigation funding). 
 102. See Kidd, supra note 16, at 151 (describing the nature of probate funding 
as contingent where the probate funder has the right to pursue some portion of 
the heir’s claim). 
 103. See id. at 152 (discussing the uncertainty of whether an heir will be 
entitled to a portion of the estate as well as timing of when that payment will 
occur). 
 104. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on 
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2362 (1999) (recognizing that judges 
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efforts to maximize their returns, undercutting the recipient’s 
claims in ways that may or may not be anticipated. Any flaws in 
the discovery process will only heighten those uncertainties.105 In 
the case of probate, we must also consider that fiduciary 
responsibilities are often assigned to family members who may or 
may not be trustworthy.106 Finally, the mere existence of a judicial 
process signals the uncertainty inherent in the system;107 if there 
were no real risk, the entire process would require nothing more 
than a clerical resolution. A minority of legal disputes might fit 
that description, but not all. 
As a result, there is always a statistically significant chance 
that any party will lose. Once a judgment has become final, some 
certainty is available,108 but, prior to that point, there is always a 
real chance of an adverse jury or bench verdict, reduction of 
damages award on appeal, denial of anticipated attorney’s fees, 
depletion of the estate through mismanagement or excessive legal 
costs, or any number of other adverse events that can reduce or 
eliminate recovery.109 A rational funder, therefore, must always 
expect that any given funding decision could be unprofitable. 
                                                                                                     
are not immune to human error and citing this as a reason for redundancy in the 
judicial process). 
 105. See George Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why 
Broad Pretrial Discovery Should Be Further Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465, 495 
(2016) (discussing the sensitivity litigation costs have to changes and uncertainty 
in the discovery process). 
 106. An untrustworthy fiduciary might abscond with the estate or might 
waste the estate through excessive litigation, as conceded by Professors Horton 
and Chandrasekher. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 143 (“[O]ne 
company lost its entire investment when the personal representative stole the 
decedent’s assets and then disappeared.”); see also id. at 163 (“[P]robate litigation 
is notorious for allowing attorneys and personal representatives to bleed the 
estate dry.”). Other contingencies that could lead to an heir not receiving the 
expected inheritance include unforeseen medical bills or child support obligations, 
as well as the discovery of an unknown will that disinherits an intestate heir that 
received funding. 
 107. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
367, 368 (2009) (“[N]o matter how much judges may strive for clarity and 
predictability, law practice will always be laden with uncertainty.”).  
 108. Of course, there is still some risk associated with collection of the 
judgment. 
 109. See id. at 371 (discussing the ongoing risk of negative outcomes including 
ongoing costs of litigation).  
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A recipient’s expectations will include these same 
uncertainties, but will also include a measure of time preference, 
as described above.110 A litigant or heir may not wish to bear the 
risks associated with the judicial process or may not care to wait 
until the lawsuit concludes or funds are released from probate.111 
The greater the time pressures on the recipient, or the more 
complicated the dispute, the greater the incentives to seek out 
funding.112 Even in the case of probate, where there is certainty 
that an estate exists, an heir could make a rational determination 
that funding now is preferable to waiting.113 In fact, outside of a 
case of coercion, the fact that litigants and heirs choose funding 
indicates that they view the risks of litigation or probate—the 
contingencies that others disparage as merely “colorable”—as 
being real and significant. After all, the funding they accept is 
lower than the value of the claim, so they have paid the funder to 
assume the risks. 
Given the risks that funders face in either the probate or the 
litigation context, a funder could be excused for insisting on an 
absolute right to repayment.114 Having done that, the funder would 
have placed her right to recovery outside the vagaries of the 
judicial system and her business practices under the authority of 
state usury laws and various federal and state regulations, such as 
                                                                                                     
 110. Supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 135 (discussing the 
“notorious delays” of the probate process and engaging with arguments that the 
probate process is “snail-like”).  
 112. See David Lazarus, Sorry for Your Loss—Would a Cash Advance Ease 
Your Pain?, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 8, 2004, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Sorry-for-your-loss-would-a-cash-
advance-ease-2719166.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing some heirs that 
use these programs as being “hard-pressed for money”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 113. See Lyon, supra note 37, at 254–55 (explaining that individuals prefer 
benefits now to benefits in the future, leading them to accept a discounted present 
amount). Time preference and substantive risk have obvious overlap, as well. 
There is always risk that the probate process will take longer than expected, with 
each passing day representing not only time that the heir does not have access to 
her inheritance but also the risk that some inefficiency will enter the process and 
reduce the total amount to be distributed amongst the heirs. The passage of time 
can therefore reduce the heir’s total award even if the heir’s share of the estate 
ends up exactly as expected. 
 114. See Molot, supra note 107, at 368 (discussing the uncertainty always 
present in law based on judicial determinations). 
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TILA.115 In other words, the funder could choose to loan funds to 
recipients, and many financial institutions take that path in other 
industries. When a funder makes a different choice, they do so with 
the intent of exposing themselves to the contingencies inherent in 
probate or litigation. That intent, according to the Restatement, 
should lead to the conclusion that probate and litigation funding 
are not carefully disguised loans but something else.116 
                                                                                                     
 115. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) would therefore apply to probate and 
litigation funding only if provision of funds to the recipient constitutes credit. Cf. 
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 102–03, 82 Stat. 146, 146–47 (1968) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–02 (2012)) (discussing the purpose of the TILA as 
covering credit which entails debtor deferment of payment). TILA covers 
extension of “credit,” which is defined as “the right granted by a creditor to a 
debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” Id. § 
1602(f). Two types of credit are covered, open-end and closed-end. Open-end credit 
requires repeated transactions and a finance charge on outstanding balance, 
something that is present in neither probate nor litigation funding. See id. § 
1602(j) (“The term[] ‘open end credit plan’ . . . mean[s] a plan under which the 
creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions . . . and which provides 
for a finance charge.”). Closed-end credit is defined only as consumer credit that 
is not open-end. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10) (2018) (“Closed-end credit means 
consumer credit other than ‘open-end credit’ as defined in this section.”). Legal 
funding is, therefore, either closed-end credit or not covered by TILA. A recipient 
of funding could loosely be said to repay the amount received, but would be 
considered credit only if it also qualified as debt. TILA does not include an express 
definition of “debt,” but state courts have regularly defined debt in terms of 
contingencies. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 140 (describing 
debt in the context of contingencies (citing Britz v. Kinsvater, 351 P.2d 986, 991 
(Ariz. 1960))). Rather than treat the state-law question as definitive as some do, 
it is worth considering the stated congressional intent in enacting TILA, which is 
to increase the “informed use of credit” by increasing “awareness of the cost 
thereof by consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). “It is the purpose of this 
subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer 
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . .” Id. The intent of this language seems 
both clear—to keep consumers from unwittingly agreeing to credit terms that will 
hurt them in the long run—and not inclusive of legal funding. There is no 
long-term harm because there are no additional consequences if the funder 
receives no payment. Finance charges do not pile up, outstanding balances do not 
become insurmountable over time, and the funder has zero claim to anything the 
recipient owns. 
 116. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 529 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) 
(discussing intent to make a loan as outweighing the form of the transaction). 
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B. What About Economics? 
Although the Restatement focuses on the contingent nature of 
the transaction,117 that is not the only way to judge whether 
something is a loan. Specifically, economics provides another set of 
criteria which center around the concept of interest rates as the 
“price” of money.118 To an economist, a loan is when the 
recipient— who needs money she does not currently possess—rents 
money from someone who possesses a surplus.119 The recipient will 
“rent” money from the lender by paying back more than the 
original amount,120 based on how long the money is kept.121 The 
difference between what is received and what is repaid is the 
rental price of money, known commonly as the interest rate.122 
Two primary factors are relevant to the determination of the 
interest rate. First, the time preference of the potential lender, 
with the necessary interest rate being higher for lenders who 
                                                                                                     
 117. See id. (discussing the element of unconditional repayment as necessary 
for usury). 
 118. See BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 629 (defining 
interest rate as “[t]he price of a loan, expressed as a percentage of the loaned 
amount per year”). 
 119. See Abba P. Lerner, Interest Theory—Supply and Demand for Loans or 
Supply and Demand for Cash, 26 REV. ECON. & STAT. 88, 88 (1944) (describing 
the increases and decreases of demand by lenders deciding whether to loan their 
money out or spend it themselves). Technically, anyone who possesses more 
money than necessary to sustain life is a potential lender. Of course, each of us 
spends money on things we don’t absolutely need, so we don’t typically begin 
looking to lend out our surplus as soon as we determine that we have sufficient 
funds to meet basic needs like shelter, clothing, and food. However, if the borrower 
begins to raise the price she is willing to pay to rent our money, we will begin to 
consider forgoing some of those things that are nice but not necessary. 
 120. The payment of interest, above and beyond the principal borrowed, 
guarantees that the total amount paid back will be more than the total amount 
borrowed. The borrower is therefore paying extra for the immediate use of the 
lender’s money.  
 121. Typically, the longer a borrower wishes to hold the lender’s money, the 
more opportunities for immediate consumption or alternative investments a 
lender will have to forgo. Because the lender will have to be compensated for these 
lost opportunities, a higher interest rate will need to be paid. See, e.g., Daily 
Treasury Bill Rates, DOT, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=billrates (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019) (showing interest rates for treasury bills by maturity) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & SHEPHERD, supra note 46, at 629  (defining 
interest as the “price a borrower pays for a loan”).  
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greatly value the ability to buy what they want immediately.123 
Second, the risk of non-payment.124 There is always some chance 
that the recipient will be unable or unwilling to make the promised 
payments in the future, and a potential lender will need to charge 
a risk premium for the use of her money.125 The risk premium can 
be lowered if the loan is a recourse loan—so that the lender has 
personal recourse against the borrower for any unpaid 
balance— and if the loan is securitized, but there will always be 
some risk that even a borrower who wants to pay will be prevented 
from doing so by unforeseen circumstances.126 
In many ways, this analysis is similar for investments; a 
potential investor has many options for spending her money, so a 
recipient must be willing to agree to terms that will convince the 
investor to forgo current spending and assume the risk that all the 
invested funds will disappear.127 The difference between the two 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Zywicki, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing the acquisition of payday 
loans by parties as being related to their urgent need of money even if it means 
taking a higher rate). 
 124. See Nicole Shea, Seven Factors That Determine Your Mortgage Interest 
Rate, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/7-factors-determine-your-
mortgage-interest-rate/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing credit score—a 
predictor of how reliably you will repay your loan—as an important factor to 
determining loan interest rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 125. One way to understand a risk premium as part of the interest rate is to 
imagine a potential lender who does not need the money immediately but has firm 
commitments that must be made in the future. That lender will want to purchase 
an insurance policy that guarantees payment in the event that the borrower fails 
to make the promised payments. It is safe to assume that, absent certain extreme 
conditions, a lender will not pay a borrower to take her money. Therefore, the 
lender will require the borrower to pay the premiums on the insurance policy. 
Most loans don’t have an express insurance policy, but the greater the risk of 
non-payment, the higher the interest rate because the lender is self-insuring 
against the risk of non-payment. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 
(2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (“A debtor’s promise of future payments is 
worth less than an immediate payment of the same total amount because the 
creditor cannot use the money right away, inflation may cause the value of the 
dollar to decline before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of 
nonpayment.”).  
 126. See Robert J. Barro, The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest, 
8 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 439, 439 (1976) (discussing the benefits of having 
collateral in a lending situation including an incentive for borrowers to pay back 
their debts and protecting the lender’s interest in the money). 
 127. See What is Risk?, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
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lies in the nature of the agreement. With a loan, the only thing of 
value being exchanged is money—money now for money later. 
Hence, the description of a loan as a rental of money. With an 
investment, there is at least one other thing of value being 
exchanged. With bond investments, there is a promise of 
repayment, but that promise is embodied in a physical or electronic 
security.128 With stock investments, there is no promise of 
repayment, only certain voting rights and a share of any declared 
dividend.129 With other investments, an equity stake in the 
company might be demanded or even partial control over the 
operations of the company. Some resemble loans in minor ways 
but, in any investment scenario, money is not the only thing 
changing hands. 
A straightforward analysis of probate and litigation funding 
transactions indicates some elements that appear similar to loans, 
but other elements that run counter to that explanation. In both 
cases, funding is provided to the recipient before the end of the 
legal dispute, and without a promise of repayment.130 When a 
funder enters into an agreement with a potential heir or litigant, 
there is no way to discern what the outcome of the dispute will be, 
so the funder knows neither whether nor when she will get paid.131 
Without this information, it is impossible for a funder to know 
                                                                                                     
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/what-risk (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the risks involved with investment) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. See Corporate Bonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-
products/corporate-bonds (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (contrasting corporate bonds 
with common stocks and the absence of equity in the company) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The important difference is that the security 
can be transferred to another person, and transferability is a characteristic that 
creates value. 
 129. See What Are Stocks?, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-
products/stocks (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (detailing the nature of an exchange 
including the rights and benefits assumed by the investor) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 130. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 115 (discussing the 
purchase of litigation claims); id. at 118 (discussing the exchange of rights as an 
heir for cash). 
 131. Cf. Steinitz, supra note 25, at 491–92 (discussing the uncertainties that 
investors are faced with when investing in litigation). 
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what the effective interest rate will be,132 making application of 
usury laws unjust.  
More importantly, however, the lack of any reasonable 
certainty regarding whether or when a return payment will be 
received is strong evidence that something other than money is 
changing hands.133 No critic of funding has ever argued that 
funders are philanthropists,134 so it would be odd to see 
funders-as-lenders giving away money without a promise of 
repayment—perhaps even a secured promise—and a schedule of 
payments. Instead, the funder receives a right to some future 
potentiality. While not reduced to a written form like a stock or 
bond, this right to a potential future payoff is a thing of value that 
changes hands in addition to money, making the transaction 
similar to an investment.135 
In the case of probate funding, the case is even stronger that 
what is occurring is something other than a loan. A probate funder 
takes over the claims of the potential heir; while the funder is still 
                                                                                                     
 132. Even some critics concede this fact but then calculate interest rates and 
argue that the funding transactions are usurious. See, e.g., Horton & 
Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 154 (arguing that funders should be able to 
“derive educated guesses” about the interest rate). While it is true that a funder 
could include a savings clause that would immediately reduce the repayment 
amount to whatever amount would fall below the usury limits doing so would 
place the funder in the unique situation of having to maintain profitability while 
being prohibited from obtaining any certainty regarding revenues. See id. at 
145– 46 (“[S]ome courts refuse to enforce these provisions, reasoning that they 
encourage lenders to charge all their customers astronomical rates and then 
merely ‘refund . . . the usurious amounts’ to ‘the few debtors who complain.’”). 
 133. Cf. Molot, supra note 107, at 371–72 (discussing the funder’s assumption 
of risk of litigation in the context of a corporation funding its own litigation).  
 134. Many, in fact, assert exactly the opposite. See Xiao, supra note 39, at 268 
(noting a concern by some critics “that financiers exploit consumers by charging 
exorbitant fees”). 
 135. In a unique formulation of this argument, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
describes litigation financing as an investment in the “common venture” of 
litigation, with plaintiffs and defendants being the common venturers. See 
Cherokee Funding LLC v. Ruth, 802 S.E.2d 865, 870 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]t is 
clear that the Defendants and the individual Plaintiffs are involved in a common 
venture, which is to prevail in the underlying personal injury lawsuits.”). While 
not a traditional way of representing the nature of litigation, it is true that the 
results of a trial are dependent on the efforts of the plaintiff and defendant, 
jointly, and that the funder’s profit is dependent entirely on those efforts, rather 
than her own. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 38–55 (1995) 
(describing private law as pitting plaintiff and defendant against each other in 
order to derive a judicial outcome). 
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pursuing claims founded in the person of the heir, the right to the 
portion of the estate covered by the funding transaction belongs 
entirely to the funder.136 As such, a probate funder has not loaned 
money to the recipient. The funder is not even a passive investor 
in an endeavor controlled by the heir. Instead, the funder has 
purchased a property right and is maximizing the value of that 
right.137 Nothing about the transaction looks like a mere rental of 
money—the definition of a loan. 
Whether we rely on legal tests or economic intuition, it is 
difficult to support the assertion that either probate or litigation 
funding are loans. There may be other reasons to regulate these 
financial transactions, as discussed in the following two Parts, but 
treating them as loans completely mischaracterizes these 
transactions in a way that violates both legal and economic 
principles.138 
III. Maintenance and Champerty 
Even if usury rules are not appropriate, funding of legal claims 
might be properly subject to other regulations, such as 
maintenance and champerty rules. These ancient common-law 
rules are designed to avoid abuses in the legal system, so the rules’ 
application to funding transactions rests on whether these 
transactions are likely to lead to the same abuses.139 That question 
is related to—but separate from—whether funding transactions 
introduce unfair financial terms into a contract. Some states have 
already abandoned champerty and maintenance140 but in the 
                                                                                                     
 136. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 121 (discussing the 
nature of control over the probate claim by the funder).  
 137. See id. (describing the control a probate funder has over the claim similar 
to those of property rights).  
 138. Infra Part IV.A–B.  
 139. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 486–87 (discussing the medieval origin of 
champerty and the goal of preventing abuses).  
 140. See Steinitz, supra note 21. at 1290 (“[A] minority of states such as 
Massachusetts and South Carolina have abandoned champerty altogether.”); see 
also Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226–27 (Mass. 1997) (“We also no 
longer are persuaded that the champerty doctrine is needed to protect against the 
evils once feared: speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or 
financial overreaching by a party of superior bargaining position. There are now 
other devices that more effectively accomplish these ends.”); Osprey, Inc. v. 
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majority of states where they are still in full force, legislators and 
judges will need to determine whether or not to apply them to 
probate and litigation funding.141 
A. Maintenance and Champerty Rules and Legal Funding 
Understanding the origins of maintenance and champerty 
rules is an important first step in determining whether they are 
properly applicable to the funding of legal claims. Maintenance is 
the support of a lawsuit by an outside party, usually when the 
outside party provides material support to one of the litigants.142 
Champerty is a form of maintenance, in which the outside party 
receives, in exchange for the material support, a promise of some 
portion of the lawsuit’s proceeds in exchange for the material 
support.143 In medieval times, maintenance was a crime and a 
tort,144 and judges refused to enforce contracts that attempted to 
transfer interests in legal claims.145 
The rules originally evolved, in large part, as a means of 
protecting the poor against exploitation by wealthy and powerful 
individuals who could afford to buy legal claims on the cheap.146 
                                                                                                     
Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 279 (S.C. 2000) (“We abolish champerty as a 
defense because we believe it no longer is required to prevent the evils 
traditionally associated with the doctrine as it developed in medieval times”); 
TMJ Haw., Inc. v. Nippon Tr. Bank, 153 P.3d 444, 449 (Haw. 2007) (“[T]his court 
has repeatedly rejected blind adherence to rules crafted to meet anachronistic 
societal demands . . . .”). 
 141. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (Consol. 2018) (prohibiting purchase of 
claims by corporations). 
 142. See Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990) (“An 
officious intermeddling in a lawsuit by a non-party by maintaining, supporting or 
assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the 
litigation.”). 
 143. See Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990) (“A bargain 
between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the 
party’s claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”). 
 144. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35 (“And therefore, by 
the Roman law, it was a species of the crimen falsi to enter into any confederacy 
or do any act to support another lawsuit.”). 
 145. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. 
L. REV. 816, 816 (1916) (discussing the assignability of “choses” in the common 
law courts of England). 
 146. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 110–11 (“Claim sales 
were so strongly associated with sharp practices that the word ‘champerty’ 
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That justification for bans on the sale of claims continued to the 
modern era.147 Other justifications for the restrictions were added 
over time, including the one most law students likely learn—that 
allowing third parties to purchase legal claims would encourage 
more litigation.148 While the rules weakened over time with regard 
to some claims,149 judges remained uncomfortable with 
third-parties pursuing claims that were based in personal injury, 
as transactions of that sort appeared as “traffic[king] in human 
pain and suffering.”150 
Are probate and litigation funding champertous? Do they raise 
the types of concerns that maintenance rules were designed to 
avoid? The answer, unsurprisingly, is it depends on who you ask. 
There is surprisingly little actual data in the legal funding 
literature regarding whether funding transactions are abusive and 
exploitative; at best, most commentators limit themselves to 
                                                                                                     
derives from ‘champart,’ an arrangement that allowed wealthy landowners to 
exploit tenants without violating the usury laws.”); see also Max Radin, 
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 55 (1935) (describing the 
practice of wealthy individuals buying claims “far below their value”); W.S. 
Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common 
Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1006–07 (1920) (describing Roman regulation of such 
practices by “prohibit[ing] assignments to persons more powerful than the 
[plaintiff]”). 
 147. See Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen 566, 569 (Mass. 1861) (defending the doctrines 
by noting that they prevented oppression of the poor by “the rich and powerful”); 
see also Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 644 (N.Y. 1824) (pointing out that 
the rules were implemented to limit the “power of great men, to whom rights of 
action were transferred”). 
 148. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 111 (“Gradually, 
however, the champerty and non-assignability rules began to decay.”); see also 
Steinitz, supra note 21, at 1288 (“[M]odern policy rationale most often cited in 
support of the imposition of champerty restrictions includes a desire to discourage 
excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigation—often associated with third 
parties seeking profit, rather than redress, through suits.”); Lampet’s Case (1612) 
77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (K.B.) (“And first was observed the great wisdom and policy 
of the sages and founders of our law, who have provided, that no possibility, right, 
title, nor thing in action shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would 
be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Brashear v. West, 32 U.S. 608, 616 (1833) (“That a chose in 
action is assignable in equity, is not controverted.”); Cook, supra note 145, at 822 
(relating the courts’ historical doctrine that “a chose in action is assignable in 
equity but not at law”). 
 150. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ark. 
1970). 
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discussions of “interest rates” which, as discussed above,151 is 
irrelevant to a discussion of legal funding. Likewise, the data is 
sparse on whether funding increases total litigation,152 due in large 
part to the complexity of the question.153 The final element, judges’ 
distaste for the practice in cases involving personal injury, is not 
subject to empirical testing.154 There are reasons to suspect, 
however, that legal funding does not raise the type of concerns that 
champerty and maintenance rules were meant to avoid. 
1. Exploitation of the Poor? 
With regard to the first motivation for these 
rules— exploitation of the poor by the wealthy and powerful155—it 
does stand to reason that the poor would have higher financial 
pressures, possibly leading them to accept a worse deal from a 
funder than a wealthy recipient. This is one area where usury 
arguments and champerty arguments overlap. As discussed 
supra,156 interest rates are the price of money and, at times, people 
find themselves in desperate need of money.157 The reasons for the 
pressures are varied, but the poor are likely to feel financial 
pressures more acutely, and it can lead them to make some very 
                                                                                                     
 151. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text (explaining why an 
interest rate cannot be calculated ex ante, absent some notion of when or if 
repayment will occur). 
 152. One substantive analysis has been attempted, with data from Australia, 
finding “slower case processing, larger backlogs, and increased spending,” but 
without a statistically significant correlation between funding and filing rates. 
David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look 
at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1097–103 (2013). 
 153. See id. at 1097–98 (discussing that Australia does not serve as the “ideal 
experiment” for assessing the effects of champerty and maintenance laws because 
the Australian states have different legal approaches to litigation funding). 
 154. See S. Farm Bureau, 454 S.W.2d at 70 (exemplifying judges’ distaste for 
third-parties pursuing claims based in personal injury by describing such claims 
as “traffic[king] in human pain and suffering”). 
 155. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the creation of champerty and 
maintenance rules “as a means of protecting the poor against exploitation by 
wealthy and powerful individuals who could afford to buy legal claims on the 
cheap”). 
 156. See supra Part III.B (providing an economics definition of loans and 
interest rates). 
 157. See supra Part III.B (same). 
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unwise decisions.158 Usury laws, like champerty rules, seem 
tailored to avoid something akin to coercion.159  
With a traditional loan, agreeing to a bad deal might cause 
long-term harm to the recipient, such as a loan where interest 
rates are so high that the promised repayment is impossible.160 A 
recipient in that circumstance might enter what is colorfully called 
a “debt spiral.”161 Payday lenders regularly receive criticism for 
lending on terms that, to the critic, appear coercive,162 and 
litigation funders are occasionally referred to as the payday 
lenders of the legal realm.163 However, closer examination shows 
this invective to be poorly applied. 
In the case of consumer litigation funding,164 the financial 
pressures that could lead the plaintiff to make a bad funding choice 
                                                                                                     
 158. See supra Part IV.A (providing a background on the origins of 
maintenance and champerty rules). 
 159. Most state laws are silent as to the purpose of usury restrictions, and it 
is possible to view those restrictions as an unprincipled mish-mash of rules and 
exceptions. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 138–39 (discussing 
the origins of champerty rules). 
 160. E.g., Stacy Cowley, Payday Loans’ Debt Spiral to be Curtailed, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2016, at A1 (“The very economics of the payday lending business 
model depend on a substantial percentage of borrowers being unable to repay the 
loan and borrowing again and again at high interest rates . . . .”). 
 161. See, e.g., id. (describing inability of certain borrowers to repay a loan). It 
is not clear why a funder would make a loan that she knew the recipient could 
not repay, given that the funder’s business model requires repayment. Something 
just short of that, however, could be both profitable to the funder and not render 
the recipient completely destitute. Doing so would require the funder to identify 
the precise amount of interest that would require the recipient to pay every dollar 
not absolutely required for survival.  
 162. See Hawkins, supra note 40, at 68–72 (describing the arguments in favor 
of payday regulation based on perceived high costs that manipulate consumers). 
 163. See Brief, Amici Curiae, supra note 13, at 12 (arguing that the Colorado 
Legislature acted to protect consumers from excessive fees charged by litigation 
funders). But see Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime 
Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 84– 85 
(2008) (describing litigation funders favorably as “merely one of a variety of 
subprime financial arrangements, such as home mortgages, payday loans, 
car-title loans and rent-to-own transactions, which can empower people without 
access to more traditional credit sources”). 
 164. This is a subset of litigation funding, in which the plaintiff receives 
money from the funder for various living expenses only indirectly related to the 
plaintiff’s ability to pursue the case. See Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects 
of Litigation Financing, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1239, 1278–79 (2016) (describing the 
uses of the funds provided by the funder to the recipient in a consumer litigation 
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are already present, and could lead a poor plaintiff to accept a bad 
settlement choice—accepting a worse settlement from the 
defendant than a wealthy defendant would.165 It is not clear, 
therefore, that litigation funding leaves the recipient worse off and 
could, potentially, make the recipient better off by allowing the 
plaintiff some relief from financial pressures in order to make a 
more reasoned judgment about what the case is worth and whether 
the settlement offer is fair.166 A potential heir does not face the 
same settlement pressures as a litigation plaintiff, so a probate 
funder might be able to exert pressures on the heir to agree to a 
disadvantageous funding arrangement.167  
Importantly, however, neither probate funding nor litigation 
funding reach the level of coercion that is often attributed to 
payday lenders because the funding agreements are 
nonrecourse.168 The plaintiff or heir receives the money 
immediately and may never have to pay anything to the funder. 
There is no danger of losing other valuable assets and no chance of 
a debt spiral.169  
The worst case scenario for the recipient would be that the 
entire award is obtained by the funder, leaving the recipient with 
no additional funds at the end of the claim.170 While it is 
understandable that the recipient could find that outcome 
                                                                                                     
context). Consumer litigation funding can be distinguished from commercial 
litigation funding, where a funder provides money to a business that is engaged 
in a legal dispute—often contractual—but is experiencing cash flow problems. See 
id. (describing the mechanics of commercial litigation funding). Also 
distinguishable are more entrepreneurial forms of litigation funding, where a 
large investment firm provides funding for a large class action. For a more 
in-depth discussion of these categories, see id. at 1278. 
 165. See id. at 1255 (discussing the costs of litigation).  
 166. See id. at 1278–79 (providing three reasons why consumer litigation 
financing presents a lower level of risk than hedge fund litigation financing). 
 167. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 114–15 (discussing 
entrepreneurs taking a stake in any future litigation settlements). 
 168. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just 
Another Form of Payday Lending?, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 119 (2017) 
(discussing difference between payday lending and consumer litigation funding). 
 169. See id. (“Because funding is nonrecourse, its customers cannot fall into 
the debt spiral that regulators often worry about with respect to payday 
lending.”). 
 170. See id. at 117 (“If the lawsuit proceeds are less than the total amount 
owed to the financier, the plaintiff must pay the financier only the lawsuit 
proceeds . . . .”). 
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disappointing, a complete analysis must also consider that the 
recipient is not left empty-handed. After all, the initial transaction 
resulted in the transfer of funds to the recipient.171 The greater the 
financial need of the recipient, the greater the value to the 
recipient of the funds, which undercuts the arguments that 
funding is coercive.172 
In the case of probate funding, this “worst-case” scenario is 
actually far more likely, given the ability of the probate funder to 
obtain all of the rights of the heir and proceed without any further 
involvement from the heir. Rather than making coercion more 
likely, however, it can actually reduce the likelihood of coercion. 
The heir enters the transaction knowing that the payment will be 
the only funds received in relation to the estate; the heir walks 
about with check in hand and need not contemplate the estate or 
the funder ever again.173 Unless the funder engaged in fraud by 
misrepresenting the nature of the transaction—in which case the 
funding contract would be voidable by the recipient—there can be 
no harm to the recipient.174 
Moreover, to the extent that coercion or exploitation is a 
perceived problem with funding transactions, the solution is not 
banning the transactions, but increasing competition in the 
market.175 After all, if one funder is dominant in the market, that 
funder could leverage its market power to offer lower amounts to 
recipients or require promises of higher future payments.176 In a 
competitive market, the offers made to recipients will be bid up by 
multiple funders.177 Similarly, regulation of funding transactions 
is likely to be influenced by large players in the market to their 
                                                                                                     
 171. See id. (explaining consumer litigation funding). 
 172. See id. at 126 (“[C]onsumers of litigation finance are using their 
nonrecourse loans for living expenses, which signals that these plaintiffs are 
cash-constrained.”). 
 173. That ability is almost certainly of value to the recipient.  
 174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“Typical instances of voidable contracts are those where one party was an 
infant, or where the contract was induced by fraud, mistake, or duress, or where 
breach of a warranty or other promise justifies the aggrieved party in putting an 
end to the contract.”). 
 175. See Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 165, 170 (2018) (discussing how competition benefits consumers). 
 176. See id. at 177 (discussing maintaining market power). 
 177. See id. at 170 (explaining how competition benefits consumers). 
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advantage and to the detriment of competition and, consequently, 
recipients.178 
At a superficial level, both forms of litigation funding might 
appear subject to concerns regarding exploitation and coercion. In 
one way, probate funding might be marginally more like 
champerty than litigation funding, but only because there are 
other coercive elements in the litigation setting that are not 
present in probate.179 Furthermore, it is important to remember 
that the nonrecourse nature of both types of funding significantly 
reduces the overall financial burden that recipients will face. As a 
result, the first factor does not weigh heavily in favor of funding as 
champerty. 
2. Increasing Litigation? 
Depriving an heir or plaintiff of the right to choose funding as 
an option is paternalistic and violative of their autonomy, 
especially if there are no reasonable alternatives. However, if 
funding increases litigation significantly, there may be spillover 
effects that could justify intervention.180 Does either form of 
funding risk a substantial increase in litigation? The answer is 
likely no.181 Surprisingly, the idea that litigation funding increases 
total litigation—and frivolous litigation, in particular—has been 
advanced by both proponents and opponents. Proponents, of 
course, make the claim as part of their argument that the courts 
are effectively closed to the poor and middle class, with litigation 
financing increasing access to justice.182 Opponents argue that 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. at 169–70 (discussing regulations and the costs of compliance). 
 179. See supra note 156 (stating the motivations behind the development of 
maintenance and champerty rules). 
 180. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a 
Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 545 (2007) (explaining the 
tragedy of the commons problem). It is worth pointing out that Sinden places her 
arguments regarding externalities in the context of a tragedy of the commons 
problem. See id. (discussing the tragedy of the commons and the problem of 
market failure). In reality, commons problems and externalities are related but 
different types of market failure, although the distinction is not necessarily fatal 
to the author’s overall argument. 
 181. For a more detailed description of the argument, see Kidd, supra note 
175, at 1255–56 (providing a background on consumer litigation funding). 
 182. See id. at 1254–55 (summarizing the argument). 
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waves of new litigation will swamp our judicial system and damage 
the economy.183  
Both, it turns out, are likely wrong. In arguing that litigation 
funding will increase litigation, both proponents and opponents 
make a fundamental mistake—they ignore the independent 
judgment that the funder must exercise in deciding whether to 
provide funding.184 When the funder’s need to at least break even 
is included in the analysis, it becomes clear that introduction of a 
funder cannot turn a losing case into a winning one.185 Apart from 
minor increases arising from plaintiffs with no access to capital or 
entrepreneurial-minded litigants bent on path manipulation,186 
litigation funding should not be expected to increase the amount of 
litigation substantially.187 
Probate funding is a relatively new subject of academic 
inquiry, so the literature is minimal, but the first analysis 
attempted to quantify the effects of funding on probate 
litigation.188 The conclusion? Probate funding increases 
                                                                                                     
 183. See BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 12, at 4 (“[Third Party Litigation 
Financing] can be expected to prompt an increase in the filing of questionable 
claims.”); Joshua G. Richey, Comment, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences 
of Third-Party Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489, 500 (2013) 
(concluding that litigation funding “encourages parties to file frivolous claims”); 
Kidd, supra note 175, at 1255–57 (arguing that litigation funding improves 
efficiency in the legal system); Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal 
Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 743–45 (2005) (addressing concerns regarding the 
alienability of legal claims). 
 184. See Kidd, supra note 175, at 1241 (providing a background on consumer 
litigation funding). 
 185. See id. at 1249–54 (“[T]here is little reason to suspect that liberalizing 
litigation-financing rules will have a significant impact on the volume of cases 
brought.”). 
 186. See id. at 1261–63 (providing a background on consumer litigation 
funding); Kidd, supra note 10, at 629–33 (discussing the debate over the funding 
of litigation). 
 187. See Kidd, supra note 175, at 1249–54 (explaining why the amount of 
litigation may not increase). This is not to say that litigation will not increase over 
time, even after an expansion of litigation funding, only that any increase is likely 
not caused by litigation funding. One can be concerned about the general increase 
in litigation—particularly frivolous litigation—yet be calm about the advent of 
funding. 
 188. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 155–67 (explaining why 
“probate lending seems manifestly different than litigation lending and heir 
hunting”). 
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litigation.189 Those results, however, are subject to a host of 
criticisms, both methodological and theoretical, which render them 
largely unreliable.190 Returning to the original objections that led 
to maintenance and champerty restrictions, probate funding 
simply cannot lead to third parties “exciting and stirring up 
suits”191 because probate funding is only possible when there is an 
estate in probate, and that requires someone to die. Providing 
money to an heir does not create the disputed estate192 nor will it 
make more people die.193 The only potential effect is to increase the 
number of procedural motions filed during the resolution of 
existing probate disputes.194 
Raising the number of procedural motions will increase the 
total costs of the probate system—though few procedural motions 
require the same level of expenditure as the filing of a new probate 
claim—but the cost of those motions must be weighed against the 
benefit achieved by them in terms of increased efficiency.195 After 
all, the size of the estate to be divided is fixed, except to the extent 
it is depleted through legal costs or other wasteful probate 
expenses.196 A probate funder’s recovery has an upper bound 
                                                                                                     
 189. See id. at 158 (“[T]here is a statistically significant relationship between 
probate loans and full-fledged litigation.”). 
 190. See Kidd, supra note 16 (responding to Professors Horton and 
Chandrasekher). 
 191. BLACKSTONE, supra note 144, at *133–34. 
 192. The decedent has determined the likelihood of probate by the manner of 
holding property, since there are ways of avoiding probate, such as holding assets 
in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship. If an estate meets the statutory 
threshold under state law, it must pass through probate. 
 193. Of course, unless it could increase birth rates, probate funding could not 
increase the amount of potential estates because everyone must die. As a result, 
the most it could do is temporally shift the existence of disputed estates to the 
present time, leaving fewer in the future.  
 194. Horton and Chandrasekher define litigation broadly, to include any 
“request for relief that sparks an objection from an adverse party.” Horton & 
Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 157. They concede that they have defined the 
term broadly and, by so doing, might have made it more difficult to rely on their 
results. See id. at 160 (“[B]ecause we defined ‘litigation’ so broadly—as any 
contested petition—we may have swept up claims that may be only tenuously 
related to the presence of a lender.”). 
 195. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 617–22 (arguing that litigation funding 
improves efficiency in the legal system). 
 196. See Skiba & Xiao, supra note 168, at 123 (explaining that the costs of 
litigation reduce the funders’ payouts). 
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defined by the heir’s interest, so unnecessary procedural motions 
would only serve to diminish the funder’s recovery.197 If those 
motions improve the efficiency of the process, however, the funder 
and all other heirs benefit.198  
One way that a funder’s involvement might improve efficiency 
is to minimize the impact of family dynamics on the estate.199 
Specifically, it might be difficult for an individual heir to be the one 
to contest disposition of the will, even though the proposed 
disposition is unfair and inefficient.200 Family dynamics can 
therefore raise transaction costs that impede an inefficient 
resolution of the dispute, and an outsider who is not bound by those 
family dynamics could reduce transaction costs and allow an 
improved outcome of the dispute.201 
For example, if probate is likely to be contentious, costs are 
likely to be higher and heirs might be legitimately concerned that 
any efforts to secure their rights will result in recriminations.202 It 
                                                                                                     
 197. Filing any legal motion increases the legal costs of probate and reduces 
the overall payout to the heirs. An heir might file out of spite or in response to 
some relational dynamic amongst the heirs, but a funder has only financial 
returns in mind. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 618 (discussing how costs of litigation 
filings may affect legal decisions). Those returns will already be less than those 
of the original heirs, since the funder has paid a specific sum for the right to 
recover from the estate. See id. (discussing the impact of filings costs on 
litigation). The costs of any filing therefore represent a larger share of the profits 
of a funder, making a funder less likely, under normal conditions, to initiate any 
filing unless its benefit clearly outweighs the cost. See Skiba & Xiao, supra note 
168 (explaining that the costs of litigation reduce the funders’ payouts). 
 198. Horton and Chandrasekher, albeit with a very limited sample, find that 
there is no increase in the amount of time required to resolve the probate dispute, 
even though the number of motions may have increased. Horton & 
Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 163. This is strong evidence that the extra 
motions are not burdensome. 
 199. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) 
(explaining the costs of undertaking a market transaction); Jeremy Kidd, 
Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 145–46 (2014) (explaining how 
bargaining can increase market efficiency). 
 200. See Kidd, supra note 199, at 143–48 (discussing the efficiency of litigation 
when considering individual and group plaintiffs). 
 201. See id. 
 202. Heirs might worry that the estate will be depleted by legal wrangling or 
that the distribution of assets will be different than they would otherwise expect. 
A contentious probate will also typically last longer. Heirs that are more risk 
averse or who have a higher time preference will be willing to pay a premium to 
a funder in exchange for the funder to assume those risks. Horton and 
Chandrasekher acknowledge this, conceding that it is possible that “litigation 
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is possible that all family gatherings would be awkward, at best, 
for years to come. A funder might file motions that the traditional 
heirs would have filed—and which should have been filed—under 
less contentious circumstances.203 By so doing, the funder may 
have sped up the process, eliminated waste, and resolved the 
dispute more efficiently.204 
There is one filing that might result in the interests of the 
funder being misaligned with the interests of the heirs—a petition 
to be appointed personal representative.205 A funder might seek to 
be assigned purely to gain the fees associated with that service.206 
However, because someone was going to receive payment for those 
responsibilities, it is merely a transfer from the likely alternative 
to the funder. Moreover, the funder is far more likely than any 
given heir to have developed expertise in disposing of an estate 
quickly and efficiently, the funder’s primary goal207 and what 
                                                                                                     
causes loans.” See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 160 (“Rather than 
establishing that loans lead to litigation, they could point in the other direction: 
that litigation causes loans.”). 
 203. See id. at 161 (discussing the effect of litigation funding on the volume of 
litigation). 
 204. The one exception are those heirs that would have benefited from 
contention, either because they prefer contention—every family seems to have 
someone like that—or because they were going to be the personal representative 
and be paid for the duration of probate. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 621–22 
(arguing that litigation funding improves efficiency in the legal system). 
 205. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 161–64 (discussing 
considerations surrounding the appointment of a personal representative). 
 206. Horton and Chandrasekher chalk this desire up to “rank self-interest.” 
Id. at 162. That assertion ignores the reality that every individual is motivated 
by self-interest and that self-interest can yield tremendous benefits for others. 
See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 26–27 (1776)  
[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it 
is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be 
more likely to prevail if he can interest their selflove in his favour, and 
shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he 
requires of them. . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our diner, but from their regard 
to their own interest. 
 207. The funder, more than anything else, wants their investment in the 
estate to be profitable, and that requires speed and minimal costs. See Kidd, supra 
note 199, at 149–51 (explaining why a funder will seek to resolve the estate 
rapidly, with minimal costs). 
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should be the primary goal of the court, as well.208 Individual heirs 
might wish the process to drag on for a variety of personal reasons, 
but the only interests that are common to all heirs are those that 
speedily and cheaply dispose of the estate.209 A funder’s interests 
are therefore properly aligned with the heirs and its appointment 
as personal representative should result in net benefits to the 
estate.210 
Neither probate nor litigation funding are likely to increase 
the amount of litigation, given the nature of the incentives they 
face.211 Litigation funders largely follow where lawyers have 
already gone, funding claims that have already been brought.212 
Although they may allow a claim to continue when it would 
otherwise have been resolved, the existence and nature of the 
claim are not determined by the presence of funding. Similarly, 
probate funding cannot increase the number of probate disputes 
and any increase in total motions is likely to lead to improvements 
in efficiency and payouts to the heirs. 
3. Ulterior Motives 
The final justification for champerty and maintenance 
restrictions was the belief that there was something intensely 
personal about legal claims, something that could not simply be 
transferred to a third party.213 This criticism is sometimes leveled 
                                                                                                     
 208. Outside of a complete dereliction of duty, a court would seemingly only 
choose a funder who has to be the personal representative because it viewed the 
funder— who has no connection to the decedent—as the one most capable of 
disposing of the estate efficiently, minimizing costs and increasing the overall 
amount that can be divided amongst the heirs. 
 209. See Skiba & Xiao, supra note 168. 
 210. Horton and Chandrasekher appear to concede this point, that replacing 
a lazy or inefficient personal representative will result in an improved outcome 
for the heirs. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 161–64 (discussing 
considerations surrounding the appointment of a personal representative). 
Immediately thereafter, however, they refer to this as “inefficient 
hypervigilance,” as if the heirs would have been far happier with a lower recover. 
Id.  
 211. See Kidd, supra note 164, at 1249–54 (explaining why the amount of 
litigation may not increase). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 111 (“[S]ociety saw 
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at legal funding, that the introduction of a funder will change the 
nature of the dispute.214 In the case of litigation funding, these 
concerns are not entirely unfounded, although they may be 
exaggerated.215 
For example, a litigation funder might provide funding in a 
case in order to pursue goals directly opposed to those of the 
recipient, such as through path manipulation.216 Path 
manipulation is an exploitation of the path-dependent nature of 
U.S. law to actively move the law in directions that are unrelated 
to the case at hand.217 Alternatively, the judicial process might also 
be distorted by a funder who becomes involved out of spite and a 
desire to injure one of the parties to the lawsuit.218 In either case, 
the presence of the funder does not change the underlying facts of 
the case, nor will the funder necessarily act contrary to the 
interests of the litigant.219 However, because a traditional 
litigation victory is not the primary objective of the funder, the 
litigant might be disadvantaged by the funder’s actions.220 
Probate funding seems less likely to be subject to these 
misaligned incentives. Path manipulation is a strategic 
manipulation of the law’s evolution, and requires both careful 
                                                                                                     
lawsuits as intrinsically personal and thus not capable of changing hands.”). 
 214. See id. at 110–11 (discussing the common law’s disfavor of “outsiders who 
injected themselves into cases”). 
 215. See id. at 111–12 (discussing the reasoning behind the evolution in 
champerty and non-assignability rules throughout history). 
 216. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 629–33 (discussing the strategy of path 
manipulation); Kidd, supra note 164, at 1261–63 (describing the potential of 
third-party litigation to lead to path manipulation). 
 217. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 629–33 (providing a background on path 
manipulation and its purposes). 
 218. In early 2016, it was revealed that venture capitalist Peter Thiel had 
paid for the case brought by Terry Bollea, also known as Hulk Hogan, against the 
tabloid website Gawker. Matt Drange, Peter Thiel’s War on Gawker: A Timeline, 
FORBES (June 21, 2016, 1:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
mattdrange/2016/06/21/peter-thiels-war-on-gawker-a-timeline/#34a4a1ea7e80/ 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Thiel was willing to incur the cost in order to punish Gawker for earlier 
revelations that Thiel is gay. Id. 
 219. See Kidd, supra note 199, at 149–51 (discussing how the monetary 
interests of the litigant and funder may align). 
 220. See Kidd, supra note 164, at 1261 (“The value of path manipulation is 
different from normal monetary awards, in that the value can be achieved even if 
the case is lost.”). 
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planning and just the right set of cases.221 Probate seems a far 
more stochastic process, subject to a randomness that would seem 
to defy attempts at long-term, strategic planning.222 Spite funding 
is likely already prevalent in probate cases, but arising from family 
members’ encouraging inefficient choices as a way of getting back 
at other heirs.223 It is unlikely to come from commercial funders, 
who see probate funding as an opportunity for arbitrage, 
demanding efficiency where inefficiency would otherwise 
prevail.224 By increasing the efficiency of the process, they increase 
the returns on their investment. 
It is possible to see the profit motive of funders as a two-edged 
sword, improving the payout to heirs but only by enforcing rights 
that no one else wishes to enforce.225 If, however, a funder is 
purchasing the entirety of the heirs’ interests, as described below, 
then its enforcement of those rights is entitled to the same respect 
as any choice by a traditional heir.226 Moreover, there are reasons 
to suspect that the traditional heirs might prefer enforcement of 
rights even though they personally cannot be seen to do so. 
Traditional heirs face two primary motivations in their 
capacity as heirs. The first is monetary, in that they would prefer 
more money to less and, as such, they would prefer the most 
efficient probate process.227 The second is relational, in that they 
would prefer to be able to interact with the other heirs in the future 
                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, 
and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
221, 239–41 (1999) (discussing how the NAACP used path manipulation to defeat 
segregation and how the Women’s Rights Project used path manipulation in 
seeking heightened protection for women under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). For a discussion of the incentives that could lead a 
party to engage in path manipulation, see Kidd, supra note 164, at 1272–78. 
 222. See Kidd, supra note 10, at 629–33 (discussing the strategy of path 
manipulation); Kidd, supra note 164, at 1261–63 (describing the potential of 
third-party litigation to lead to path manipulation). 
 223. See, e.g., Bollea, supra note 218 (discussing Peter Thiel’s spite lawsuit). 
 224. See Kidd, supra note 199, at 145 (describing the funder’s need for 
efficient resolution of the estate). 
 225. See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 162 (describing how 
probate funders are incentivized to protect their investment). 
 226. See id. at 121 (discussing the alienation of probate rights). 
 227. See Kidd, supra note 164, at 1246–50 (defining expected payout of 
lawsuits). 
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without significant conflict.228 Challenge another heir’s selection as 
personal representative or dispute a choice made by the personal 
representative and family reunions could be very awkward for the 
indefinite future.229 If a choice to challenge the personal 
representative will increase the monetary payout to the remaining 
heirs but also increase conflict in the future, many or all of the 
heirs may choose to do nothing.230 This choice is perfectly rational, 
resulting from the individual heirs’ higher subjective valuation of 
the relational value of abstaining.231 Allowing a funder into the 
system allows for actions that improve the payout to all heirs but 
that could not have been taken by any traditional heir.232  
Now, when the challenge is filed, it is filed by this outsider, 
rather than an heir.233 The previous personal representative may 
                                                                                                     
 228. The conflict arises from one traditional heir challenging another, 
disrupting the harmony that exists within that group. Of course, some families 
exhibit entirely different relational dynamics and a challenge between family 
members would not disrupt the harmony of the family/friends because that 
harmony does not exist. In those cases, of course, at least one traditional heir will 
make the challenge and this critique simply doesn’t apply. See supra Part IV.A.2 
(discussing, in part, familial relations and probate proceedings). 
 229. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing, in part, familial relations and probate 
proceedings). 
 230. Heirs face the payout function , , where m represents the 
monetary award and c represents conflicts arising from actions taken during 
probate. Standard assumptions regarding utility of wealth assure that 0. 
For most individuals, it can be assumed that avoidance of conflict is an 
improvement, so 0. Some actions taken within the probate process will 
improve monetary awards only by disturbing family or friends who area also 
heirs; if m and c both increase, the sign of the change in overall payout will be 
indeterminate, dependent on the magnitude of the two effects. Revealed 
preferences would indicate that a petition or objection not filed by the heirs is 
seen as yielding a net decrease in payout because the conflict effect dominates. 
Forcing the heirs to file this petition or objection would therefore reduce the 
payout of at least one heir. 
 231. See Kidd, supra note 164, at 1246–50 (defining expected payout of 
lawsuits). 
 232. Unlike the heirs, the funder will likely never have to interact with any 
heirs in the future, so no familial dynamics will be disturbed by filing a petition 
or objection that will displace an heir or disturb the expectations of various heirs. 
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how familial dynamics affect 
litigation decisions). In effect, while the funder still values wealth, 0, the 
funder need not fear future conflict, so 0.  
 233. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 118 (describing the 
alienation of probate rights as “bring[ing] an outsider into the 
judicially-supervised probate system”). 
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still be upset at being removed, but the ill-feelings are far more 
likely to be directed at the funder, rather than the other 
heirs— even the heir who sold an interest to the funder.234 Every 
heir—including the original personal representative—will enjoy 
the increased payout, and any future conflict will have been 
reduced or eliminated. In this way, many probate disputes can be 
viewed as having a dual equilibrium. In the first, lower-value 
equilibrium, all parties accept the inefficiencies of a given personal 
representative as a way of maximizing total value.235 A second, 
higher-value equilibrium exists where all parties can enjoy higher 
total value, but it requires an external actor who does not attach 
any negative value to future conflict with the heirs.236 
Although there are ways in which the presence of a funder 
might change the fundamental nature of the case, circumstances 
where that is likely to be the case are rare. In other ways, the 
presence of a probate funder can make subtle changes, but those 
changes tend to improve the efficiency of the dispute and improve 
the collective outcomes for the heirs.237 When considered with the 
lack of increased litigation and the lack of exploitation in funding 
transactions, there is little justification left for arguing that 
probate and litigation funding are champertous.238 As a word of 
caution, it is possible that, at some future time, new entrants to 
the funding market or changes in the overall structure of the 
market could alter this analysis. For the time being, however, 
there is no reason to apply maintenance and champerty rules to 
the funding of legal claims. 
B. Legal Funding as Purchase of Property 
Even if the reader disagrees with the foregoing, there is one 
more reason as to why both usury laws and champerty rules should 
                                                                                                     
 234. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing familial relations and 
probate proceedings). 
 235. See supra note 207 (discussing how the monetary interests of the litigant 
and funder may align). 
 236. See supra note 207. 
 237. See Kidd, supra note 199. 
 238. See Kidd, supra note 164, at 1249–54 (explaining why the amount of 
litigation may not increase). 
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not apply to probate funding at least: they are more accurately 
described as a purchase of a property interest.239 In many cases, 
what an heir stands to inherit is actual property, real or 
personal.240 Even in those cases where the heir inherits money, it 
is often derived from the sale of property,241 indicating that the heir 
had a de facto interest in that property.242  
An owner of property is entitled to sell that property without 
concern for whether the profit or loss will exceed government usury 
limits, because the sale of property is simply not governed by those 
laws. Likewise, an owner is entitled to sell property without regard 
for whether the property is subject to dispute, so long as the buyer 
is aware of the legal dispute.243 The existence of the legal dispute 
over ownership just makes the property interest contingent, which 
will impact the purchase price, but it does not limit the alienability 
of whatever interest the seller may possess.244  
Under modern rules, courts “generally do not apply the 
doctrine [of champerty] to parties who first acquire an interest in 
property and then bring a cause of action related to that 
property,”245 which is what probate funders do.246 The history of 
inheritance alienation, however, is convoluted, with courts often 
refusing to enforce the sale of an expected inheritance while the 
testator was still alive.247 Some jurisdictions allowed the sale of 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 110 (“Plaintiffs with civil 
claims and individuals who expect to inherit from a probate estate possess 
property rights that depend on the outcome of a matter in court.”). 
 240. Horton and Chandrasekher make this point explicitly in their empirical 
analysis. See id. at 157 (describing how one independent variable used was 
whether the probate process “divided property unequally among 
similarly-situated relatives”) (emphasis added). They also describe a number of 
funding transactions in which the funder was granted an interest in real property. 
Id. at 144 n.244. 
 241. See id. at 163 n.319 (discussing the special considerations regarding the 
liquidation of real assets in the probate process). 
 242. Id.  
 243. See 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.20 (2018) (discussing the duty to 
disclose). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 160–61. 
 246. See id. (providing description of probate funders’ actions when acquiring 
a probate interest). 
 247. Courts argued that such transactions were likely to be unfair. See, e.g., 
Graef v. Kanouse, 238 N.W. 377, 379 (Wis. 1931) (concluding that the sale of 
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inheritance rights once the testator had passed,248 but some 
commentators remain unconvinced by the “formalistic logic”249 
that prohibits alienability prior to the testator’s death but permits 
it afterwards. 
It is not clear whether use of the term “formalistic” is intended 
to deny any logical distinction between pre-death and post-death 
but, from the perspective of a probate dispute, there can hardly be 
a more intuitive line of demarcation. Prior to the testator’s death, 
the property belongs to her, and the heir may never inherit, so an 
attempted alienation borders on metaphysical.250 Perhaps the 
uncertain nature of the transaction is what led courts to reject such 
agreements.251 However, once the testator has passed, she is no 
longer capable of owning property and her will—or state law in the 
                                                                                                     
inheritance rights were sure to be “burdensome and unfair”). Also, these 
transactions are exploitative of vulnerable individuals. See, e.g., In re Strange’s 
Estate, 300 N.Y.S. 23, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937) (justifying a rule against 
alienability of inheritance rights as “protect[ing] improvident children” from 
“money speculators”); Hite v. Hite, 166 N.E. 193, 196 (Ohio 1929) (arguing that 
those who sell their inheritance rights are “defenseless and exposed to the 
demands of the other [party] under the pressure of necessity”). Other courts 
reasoned that the heir had no property right to alienate, since the testator 
retained full control over property while she lived, see, e.g., Hart v. Gregg, 32 Ohio 
St. 502, 511 (1877) (“During the father’s life, all that the son had was a mere 
naked possibility . . . which could not be released, assigned, or devised.”), or for 
unstated public policy reasons. See, e.g., Flatt v. Flatt, 225 S.W. 1067, 1068 (Ky. 
1920) (“[T]his court has uniformly held in many cases that a sale of a mere 
expectancy in land is against public policy . . . .”); In re Zimmerman’s Will, 172 
N.Y.S. 80, 89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918) (“I have little doubt that in our law a voluntary 
assignment of a spes successionis would not be enforceable, even in equity.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Hite v. Hite, 166 N.E. 193, 196 (Ohio 1929); In re Michels’ 
Estate, 63 P.2d 333, 334 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (“The title of the decedent in 
and to the properties of his estate vested immediately upon his death in . . . his 
sole heir . . . [giving her] an absolute right to assign her interest in the 
estate . . . .”); Phelan v. Elbin, 79 A. 187, 189 (Conn. 1911) (“The heir at law takes 
a vested interest in all the real estate of an intestate immediately upon the latter’s 
death.”). 
 249. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 120 (discussing the 
uncertainty caused by the conflicting approaches to alienation). 
 250. A society could choose a rule that would allow individuals to voluntarily 
contract for the transfer of property that neither one owns, so long as there is no 
fraud or deception. It is possible to believe that the purchaser of such a 
contingency is foolish while still permitting them their foolishness. Public policy 
goals might weigh in favor of a ban on such transactions—as they do with bans 
on gambling—but that is a political choice. See supra note 247 (identifying cases 
that refused to alienate interests due to unstated public policy reasons). 
 251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
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absence thereof—will determine who is the owner of the property 
that comprises her estate.252 At the moment of her death, the 
interests of the heirs are no longer metaphysical, but enforceable 
under law.253 
It is also an abuse of language to claim that a probate funder 
is able to “literally[] buy[] a lawsuit.”254 The only thing that the 
funder literally purchases is the heir’s interest in the estate, 
whatever the probate court determines that to be.255 Of course, 
that interest must include the right to defend that interest against 
all who would diminish its value, including other heirs during the 
probate process.256 Such a right was surely possessed by the 
original heir and, absent some specific mention in the contract of 
sale, the purchaser would obtain all rights not personal to the 
original heir.257 The right to file motions in probate—as opposed to 
the right to file or maintain a lawsuit—is, at best, indirect and 
derivative of what the funder has actually purchased.258 
When a probate funder purchases a property interest 
previously owned by an heir, she is not subject to usury laws any 
more than would be the purchaser of real estate who obtains a 
large profit from the later sale of the property.259 She is no more 
subject to champerty restrictions than would be a purchaser of real 
                                                                                                     
 252. See supra note 248 (citing cases which articulated the interests in the 
estate transfer immediately upon death of testator). 
 253. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 104 (telling the story of 
a decedent’s assets going through probate). 
 254. Id. at 121 (citing In re Estate of Davis, 467 N.E.2d 402, 403 (App. Ct. Ill. 
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 255. See id. at 118–30 (providing a background of probate lending). 
 256. See id. 
 257. The court in In re Davis was asked to rule specifically on the alienability 
of the right to contest the will, not on the alienability of inheritance rights, 
generally. See In re Estate of Davis, 467 N.E.2d 402, 403 (App. Ct. Ill. 1984) 
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whether appellant had a vested interest in the decedent’s estate). A rule 
prohibiting assignment of the right to contest a will is logically compatible with a 
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(discussing an appellant’s ability to contest a will).  
 258. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the distinction between motions filed 
in probate and lawsuits). 
 259. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 16, at 118–30 (providing a 
background of probate lending). 
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estate who then files lawsuits to ward off nuisances, attempted 
adverse possession, unlawful easements, or waste by tenants. She 
is not merely an heir hunter, selling information about the estate 
to heirs in return for a later payout, but has purchased 
property— sometimes identifiable, tangible property. The nature of 
probate funding transactions makes champerty and usury 
restrictions inapplicable.260 
Litigation funders, in those states that have maintained their 
rules against maintenance and champerty, will find this latter 
argument unavailing. While most litigation funding does not pose 
the type of threats that champerty restrictions were intended to 
prevent,261 most states do not recognize a fully-alienable property 
right in legal claims, at least not universally.262 Any attempt by a 
litigation funder to contract for the full property rights of the 
plaintiff in her legal claim is likely to be disregarded as an illegal 
contract. 
V. Conclusion 
Probate funding, in its current form, is relatively new, likely 
emerging during the early 2000s.263 It is similar to litigation 
funding in many ways, but it is also different in important ways, 
making it an exciting new point of reference in the debate over the 
funding of legal claims. 264 It is also largely unregulated,265 making 
it an outlier in the realm of financial and funding services.266 The 
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absence of regulation makes many people nervous, so there will 
undoubtedly begin a movement to regulate probate funders. Before 
doing so, lawmakers and regulators should be careful to 
understand exactly what probate funding is, so that regulation will 
not destroy an emerging market for a product that at least some 
consumers find valuable. 
One of the most destructive things that regulators can do is 
apply ill-fitting but existing regulations because the 
to-be-regulated activity looks similar to something that is already 
subject to regulations. To be effective, regulations should be seen 
and wielded as precision instruments, not sledgehammers 
designed to smash the regulated activity into submission. An 
ill-fitting regulation, like an incorrect screwdriver, is more likely 
to strip the head of a screw, making it unusable. Rather than 
making heirs’ lives worse off by destroying the probate funding 
market, regulators should seek to understand how probate funding 
is similar and different from existing financial products and 
services.267 This Article provides a beginning to that 
understanding. That understanding can also inform the ongoing 
debate regarding litigation funding by contrasting the two types of 
funding. 
In the end, probate and litigation funding both differ 
significantly from traditional loans because they are nonrecourse 
and because the very nature of our legal system includes 
significant risk. Instead, they bear some resemblance to various 
forms of investments, making existing usury laws inapplicable. 
The potential harms that give rise to usury laws and champerty 
restrictions are largely absent from litigation funding and almost 
entirely absent from probate funding.268 Finally, probate funding 
looks a great deal like a transfer of property rights, which would 
place it entirely outside the realm of usury and champerty rules. 
Litigation funding has many of the same characteristics but 
current law does not allow full alienation of personal legal claims. 
Neither probate nor litigation funding are a particularly good 
fit for existing regulations, as they do not occupy the same space 
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or serve the same function as most financial services and products. 
Probate funding, in particular, differs substantially, making it 
particularly troubling that some have begun calling for the 
application of current laws and regulations. This Article should 
provide a counter to those notions. If regulation of litigation and 
especially probate funding is needed, it should occur according in 
a way that accepts the reality of the funding model, rather than a 
caricature. 
